The Internet of the Privileged
According to the latest information from Rest of World, Iran could soon transform its temporary internet blackout into a permanent two-tier system. The idea is simple but terrifying: a filtered national internet for the masses, access to the global web reserved for regime-approved elites.
This isn't dystopian science fiction. It's a plan being developed by a government that has already proven its ability to cut internet during the 2019 and 2022 protests. The difference is that this time, the blackout would become structural.
How It Works
The technical architecture already partially exists. Iran has developed its own national network, SHOMA, which hosts local versions of popular services. An Iranian YouTube, an Iranian Google, an Iranian messaging app. All under total government control.
The plan involves physically separating this national network from the global internet. Ordinary citizens would only have access to SHOMA. To reach the international web — Google, Twitter, Wikipedia — you would need special authorization, reserved for officials, approved businessmen, and surveilled academics.
Technically, it's feasible. North Korea already operates on this model. China maintains a hybrid system with its Great Firewall. Iran isn't inventing anything — it's radicalizing an existing model.
The End of VPNs
Iranians currently bypass censorship through VPNs. These tools encrypt traffic and route it through foreign servers, making what the user views invisible to authorities. It's a game of cat and mouse: the regime blocks, citizens find new ways.
A two-tier internet would make this resistance technically impossible. If the physical cables to the outside are cut for the public network, no VPN can create connectivity that doesn't exist. It's the difference between blocking a door and removing the entire wall.
Experts estimate that 80% of Iranians use VPNs to access international social networks. That number would drop to zero in the new system — except for those who could obtain clandestine satellite access.
Economic Implications
Such isolation would have massive economic consequences. The modern economy depends on the global internet. Iranian companies trading abroad, freelancers working for international clients, tech startups — all would be paralyzed.
The regime seems to consider this price acceptable. The priority is control, not prosperity. And for the elite who would retain international access, business would continue normally. That's precisely the point: creating a technologically privileged class dependent on the regime for their access to the world.
An Exportable Model
What makes this project particularly concerning is its export potential. If Iran demonstrates that a country can function with a fragmented internet, other authoritarian regimes could follow.
Russia is already building its RuNet, a national network capable of operating independently. China continuously perfects its control. Countries like Myanmar, Venezuela, or Turkey are watching these experiments with interest.
The universal internet we know — imperfect but relatively open — could fragment into a constellation of controlled national networks. The splinternet is no longer a theoretical hypothesis. It's a project in progress.
Technical Resistance
Faced with this threat, technologists are developing countermeasures. Mesh networks allow creating local connections without going through central infrastructure. Satellite communications, like Starlink, offer a bypass route — if terminals can be smuggled in.
But these solutions remain marginal. They can serve determined activists, not an entire population. And regimes know this: repressing a few thousand dissidents is manageable, controlling millions of citizens online is what really worries them.
What This Means for the World
Iran isn't an isolated case. It's a laboratory. If this system works — if the regime maintains power while cutting its population off from the world — others will follow.
The West expresses outrage but does little. Existing sanctions haven't prevented the regime from developing its censorship infrastructure. Western tech companies, despite their statements about freedom of expression, continue selling network equipment to intermediaries who outfit these systems.
The open internet wasn't an accident. It was an architectural choice. And that choice is being undone, country by country, cable by cable, firewall by firewall.
The Urgency to Act
Every passing month makes fragmentation harder to reverse. Infrastructure is built, technical skills develop, populations adapt. Soon, a unified global internet will be a memory for older generations and a myth for young Iranians.
The question is no longer whether we can prevent this evolution, but whether we can limit its spread. And for now, the answer seems to be no.